





For emerging capital securities markets,1 is the United States' approach useful
when determining the structure and components of such markets? Does the U.S.
system serve as a panacea for these developing markets or as an inflexible bureau-
cratic maze to be sidestepped with impunity? Stated succinctly, the answer is
that the U.S. model may be useful in certain contexts, but that each emerging
capital market should adhere to an approach compatible with its culture and
reflective of the costs and efficiencies implicated.
Today, with the continual need for the infusion of funds and the increased
competition of obtaining such funds from traditional sources,2 countries with
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1. See Hal S. Scott & Philip A. Wellons, Emerging Markets: Privatization and Institutional
Investors, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION 965-1004 (1995).
2. Private sources of capital have been reluctant to invest in developing countries' economies
as a result of such countries' macroeconomic difficulties, political instability, and/or opaque legal
systems. "As a result, the multilateral development banks (MDBs), particularly the World Bank
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emerging economies look with ardor to establishing attractive capital markets in
order to procure sought-after capital from private sources, frequently from
abroad.3 Countries spanning the globe from continent to continent seek access
to a healthful cut of this elusive pie.4 Even countries within geographic regions
join together for this common purpose.5
Countries with emerging securities markets are not alone in their quest for
inducing the inflow of capital. They compete not only with the supposedly sophis-
ticated securities markets in, for example, New York,6 London7 and Tokyo,8 but
also with a host of markets that have strong regional or at least local impact in
procuring capital (including, for example, the Singapore, Johannesburg, and
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), have had to provide the
majority of the capital to these countries .... "Matthew H. Hurlock, New Approaches to Economic
Development: The World Bank, the EBRD, and The Negative Pledge Clause, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J.
345 (1994) (footnote omitted). For further information on the history of the World Bank and its
effect on lending to developing countries, see RECOVERY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: THE LONDON
SYMPOSIUM ON THE WORLD BANK'S ROLE (1985).
3. "FDI flows to the developing world, which represented roughly a quarter of global FDI
flows in 1992, increased from US $500 million in 1965 to US $38 billion in 1992 .... IBRAHIM
E. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE WORLD BANK GUIDELINES 2 (1993)
(citing THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27 (1993)).
4. In 1992 it was estimated that of the 116 low- and middle-income countries reporting to the
World Bank Debtor Reporting System, the percentage of Direct Foreign Investment by region was
as follows in billions of U.S. dollars: Latin America, 13.8; East Asia, 15.1; Europe and Central
Asia, 5.7; Middle East and North Africa, 2.1; Sub-Saharan Africa, 1.3; and South Asia, 0.4. SHIHATA,
supra note 3, at 7; see also Michael R. Segit, South Africa Tries to Win Back Investors, WALL ST.
J., May 1, 1996, at 1 (although foreign investors are "fleeing," South Africa's economic potential
is "huge" and now presents a "buying opportunity").
5. See, e.g., Angola-Botswana-Lesotho-Malawi-Mozambique-Namibia-Swaziland-Tanzania-
Zambia-Zimbabwe: Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 32 I.L.M. 116 (1993)
(Introductory Note by Rosalind H. Thomas). See generally MORRIS GOLDSTEIN ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS PROSPECTS AND POLICY ISSUES (International Monetary
Fund World Economic and Financial Surveys, 1992); Jane Winn, How to Make Poor Countries Rich
and How to Enrich Our Poor, 77 IOWA L. REV. 899 (1992).
6. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the most renowned securities marketplace in the
world. The NYSE was founded in 1792 and has become the leader in an emerging global marketplace.
There are more than 2500 companies from around the world who list their shares on the NYSE.
Approximately 51 million Americans own stock in companies or shares in stock mutual funds, and
more than 10,000 U.S. institutions with $5 trillion in securities under management have access to
and use the NYSE market. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 3, 4 (1994) [hereinafter FACT
BOOK].
7. In the United Kingdom there are two markets, the London Stock Exchange and the Unlisted
Securities Market. The London Stock Exchange's Official List consists of approximately 2500 compa-
nies, including about 500 overseas companies. See DOING BUSINESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 50,
63 (1994).
8. There are eight stock exchanges in Japan; however, most of the trading occurs on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange (TSE). It represents 87% of the nation's total equity trading volume. The TSE had
approximately 1641 publicly traded domestic companies and 125 foreign corporations listed at the
end of 1991. See DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 38, 52 (1993).
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Stockholm Exchanges).9 As a result, the challenge facing emerging capital mar-
kets is daunting.
Emerging markets compete for a finite amount of private investment in an
increasingly competitive world. They must persuade astute investors to impart
capital in their respective countries rather than in seemingly countless other venues
that provide greater comfort. With the availability of readily accessible capital
markets having relatively long-standing stability, 0 what benefits can an emerging
market offer to attract investors? Key inducements, for example, are: the realistic
lure of impressive profit; a relatively stable political climate; liquidity and negotia-
bility of investment; control over one's investment; and regulation that promotes
market integrity and ethical business practices (without unduly infringing upon
privacy concerns and entrepreneurial creativity). 1 Of course, the reality may be
such that the preceding inducements serve merely as platitudes, incapable of
effective implementation. Political instability, inexperience with capital markets,
and the absence of funding to establish (and maintain) regulatory oversight may
prevail. 12 In such event, successfully inducing the inflow of capital may well
depend on the ability of such emerging capital markets to persuade investors that
substantial profits are likely to be made. Certainly, this task of persuasion is
easier in a country such as China as compared to Macedonia. 3
Needless to say, there is no fixed agenda to which emerging securities markets
9. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is the only stock exchange in South Africa. For
more information on JSE, see DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1994). The Stockholm Stock
Exchange (Stockholms Fondb6rs) is the only authorized exchange in Sweden as of 1991, and only
a limited number of foreign securities are traded on the exchange. For more information, see DOING
BUSINESS IN SWEDEN (1991).
The Stock Exchange of Singapore has 26 local member firms and recently admitted seven interna-
tional members. For additional information, see Doing Business in Singapore (1993).
10. The long-standing and well-regulated exchanges reputedly offer desired stability. See FACT
BOOK, supra note 6; DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 8.
11. See Pardy, Institutional Reform in Emerging Securities Markets, in POLICY RESEARCH WORK-
ING PAPERS, COUNTRY ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, THE WORLD BANK WPS 907 (1992).
12. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) formed the International Institute for Securi-
ties Market Development (the Institute) to assist countries in building sound regulatory structures.
A seminar was held in 1991 for officials responsible for the creation, development, and supervision
of emerging securities markets. Seventy-five officials from 32 countries attended. Yugoslavia was
among the countries that attended. This country is a prime example of a country experiencing political
instability, inexperience with capital markets, and regulatory funding problems. Efforts have been
made by Yugoslavia to improve its markets through additional regulation. See James Doty, Capital
Market Developments in Central and Eastern Europe: The SEC Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES MARKETS 37 (1991); see also Daniel F. Roules & Chavdar Popow, Bulgaria's Bid to
Lure Foreign Investments, 30 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS No. 2, at 38 (Sept./Oct. 1995).
13. But see Foreigners Shun New Issues in China, USA TODAY, INT'L ED., July 24, 1995, at
6B; see also James M. Dorsey, Istanbul's Bourse Has Allure Even as that Streak Is Cooled by
Political Perils for Turkish Reform, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1996, at C12; Stanley Siegel, The Long
March to a Market Economy: An Examination of the New Company and Securities Laws of the
People's Republic of China, in EMERGING FINANCE MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 497 (J. Norton & M. Andenas eds., 1996).
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must adhere. Ala carte serves as the menu of preference. Given different cultures,
political climates, and degrees of access to internal and/or traditional sources of
capital, each country's realities call for distinct choices.' 4 Hence, rather than
designating a "set menu" for emerging capital markets, the more prudent course
is to identify those components worthy of consideration. In this endeavor, due
to its impact and supposed respect in the world capital markets, the U.S. system
is a key source that should be explored.
Irrespective of the contours of the framework ultimately adopted, it must re-
ceive approbation by participants in the affected securities market. The system
adhered to will be difficult enough to effectuate; skepticism at the outset will
reduce such likelihood to virtually nil. Therefore, input, dialogue, and consensus
are essential; affected constituencies must "buy into" the framework's sensibility
and prospect for success. 15 Also, skilled draftsmanship in formulating statutes
and regulations in this complex area should be top priority. A clearly written
statute (accompanied by coherent legislative history) will serve as a valuable
resource when the meaning and scope of the statute are later questioned. 16
This article analyzes the ingredients that an emerging capital securities market
may embrace. In this task, the U.S. framework serves to some extent as a model
for possible adaptation as do models from other countries, such as England. '
Utilizing this approach, the article addresses several key issues that emerging
capital securities markets may wish to consider, namely: (1) the choice between
government and self-regulation; (2) personnel and funding needs to enforce the
laws and other norms deemed worthy of protection; (3) civil versus criminal
governmental enforcement; (4) the merits of a private attorney general approach;
(5) opting for a disclosure rather than a merit-based system; (6) facilitating access
to and growth of securities markets; and (7) the delicate task of overseeing the
activities of financial intermediaries.
Not surprisingly, a number of the foregoing issues are related and should be
considered in a unified manner. Given the complexity and wide spectrum of
choices facing each respective securities market, the ever-present challenge is to
14. "Hungary began this decade with one of the least centralized economies, but the highest
per capita debt, in Central and Eastern Europe." Doty, supra note 12, at 10. Many countries like
Hungary turn to privatization to promote the development of the private sector by "levelling the
playing field" to broaden share ownership so that the public has the tools to save money, and as a
means to reduce the government's role in the economy. HAL S. SCOTT & PHILLIP A. WELLONS,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTION, POLICY, AND REGULATION 967 (1995); G. Spasov, Starting
from Ground Zero: The New Bulgarian Securities Act, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS at 473 (J. Norton & M. Andenas eds., 1996).
15. Examples of this effort were seen when the Institute held a seminar in 1991. In Budapest,
"a group of high level Hungarian officials, outside lawyers, an IFC representative, directors of
brokerage firms and an SEC staff representative met to discuss the SEC's report. As a result of the
meeting, officials of Hungary's Ministry of Justice, with assistance from the SEC, are drafting a
package of amendments to Hungarian securities laws." Doty, supra note 12, at 9.
16. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
17. See DOING BUSINESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 50-63 (1994).
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respond in a cohesive, consistent fashion that adequately addresses the underlying
problems cost effectively while not being perceived as either too zealous or too
lax by interested parties. To successfully meet this challenge remains an awesome
if not impossible task for any capital securities market, let alone an emerging
market.
I. Government Regulator or Self-Regulatory Organization?
Irrespective of the sophistication of a particular capital securities market, it
is clear that some form of oversight or regulation is appropriate. The options
include, for example, (1) a central government regulator having extensive author-
ity; (2) government regulation by means of regional bodies; (3) self-regulation
conducted by stock exchanges and/or other self-regulatory organizations (SROs)
established to oversee issuers and financial intermediaries (such as brokers, deal-
ers, investment advisers, and clearing agents); and (4) some combination of the
foregoing.,8
Government regulation along the lines of the United States' Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) may evoke fear of stringent government regulation
that impedes capital formation and entrepreneurial creativity. According to such
critics, the resulting bureaucratic maze with its accompanying high transaction
costs is a burden that emerging and even more-developed securities markets can
ill afford. 9
On the other hand, to induce investors to enter these markets, an oversight
authority ordinarily must be in place to help engender much-needed confidence in
market integrity. Where sharp practices prevail (or are so perceived), mechanisms
should be implemented to enforce applicable law and to deter fraud. In such
circumstances, much can be said for speaking loudly and carrying a big stick.2 ° In
18. In the United States, federal, state, and SRO regulations are all employed. Of course, the
underlying circumstances often will dictate the scope of activity of the applicable regulator(s). See
Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIEs REGULATION (3d ed. 1989); see also Middle East: Credit
Rating Agencies in Pakistan, Arab World Will Expand Interest, Confidence in Emerging Debt Markets,
9 INT'L SEC. REG. REP. No. 14, at 5 (1996) (describing that credit rating agencies will be established
throughout the Middle East, thus hopefully providing key information relating to company financial
performance, both historical and forward-looking).
19. See Jan Helner, Stock Exchange Law: The Need for Legislation and Research, in STOCK
EXCHANGE AND CORPORATION LAW 61, 62 (C. Roos ed., 1984) (stating that "the very detailed
regulation in the American Securities Act is not attractive to [Sweden]").
20. Although Russia had adopted certain regulations to govern the process of privatization,
control its emerging securities markets, and regulate brokers, these laws were not effective because
the Ministry of Finance did not use its authority to enforce those standards.
Despite its authority, the Ministry of Finance did not take proactive measures in the market and,
as a result, little enforcement occurred. Brokers receiving licenses had little fear of revocation.
Prospectus reviews did not result in meaningful disclosure standards. Therefore, enhancing the
Ministry of Finance's oversight seemed unlikely to bring much additional order to the market. In
addition, the Ministry of Finance may have had motives inconsistent with an open market. J. Robert
Brown, Jr., Order from Disorder: The Development of the Russian Securities Markets, 15 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 509, 552 (1995).
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those countries where an SRO by custom or law cannot command such presence, a
government regulator is the preferable route.
Regardless of whether a U.S.-type SEC is established or self-regulation or
some hybrid, adequate powers should be provided. Such powers include, for
example, (1) investigatory authority (such as the ability to issue subpoenas de-
manding the production of relevant documents and the appearance of individuals
to testify under oath); (2) enforcement authority enabling the regulator to seek
either directly or efficiently through a different regulatory source remedial relief
(such as injunctions, disgorgement, and the appointment of a receiver) as well
as punitive measures (including civil fines, forfeitures, and criminal prosecution);
and (3) the wherewithal to secure judicial relief (such as criminal contempt) in
the event of a subject person's noncompliance with an order previously imposed.21
Whether a particular capital securities market opts for a government regulator
or SRO oversight may depend on such factors as the applicable country's culture,
resources, and level of sophistication in this area. Difficult choices have to be
made. It may be argued that a country with little expertise that seeks to develop
a securities market would be imprudent, from both a cost and efficiency perspec-
tive, to establish a U.S.-type SEC.22 This putting the cart before the horse approach
elevates theory over reality, reflecting waste with little tangible benefit. On the
contrary, it may be asserted with some justification that, unless the prospects
for economic gain are strikingly encouraging, investors outside of the host country
will not enter a market that lacks basic regulatory oversight. 23 Hence, in order
to induce the inflow of foreign capital, it may be necessary for a country with
an emerging capital securities market to establish a governmental regulatory
body.24
II. Money and Resources-Seemingly Always a Key Dilemma
Irrespective of a market's level of sophistication, funding and resources for
adequate oversight pose a continuing dilemma. When demands are high for such
21. See MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE
ENFORCEMENT (1985 & 1995 supp.).
22. See John J.A. Burke, The Estonian Securities Market Act: A Lesson for Former Republics
of the Soviet Union, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 545, 550 (1994) ("The securities laws of the
United States, Great Britain, and Canada, for example, would be totally inappropriate for Estonia,
given the complexity of their legal systems and the different levels of their economic development. ")
23. Poland is a good example of where regulatory oversight and enforcement of applicable
requirements resulted in the success of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. "This appearance of a well
regulated stock market where liquidity is guaranteed by over 400,000 private local investors has
attracted many foreign investors, who often buy and sell shares on the WSE as a hedge." William
C. Philbrick, The Task of Regulating Investment Funds in the Formerly Centrally Planned Economies,
8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 539, 547 (1994).
24. See Burke, supra note 22, at 551 (observing that for Estonia, "a securities regulatory system
is essential to encourage foreign investment, to provide adequate investor protection, and to minimize
the possibility of corruption").
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crucial matters as education, health care, defense, and infrastructure, the zeal for
pursuing inside traders and stock manipulators more effectively by appropriating
generous funds is not surprisingly chilled. This dilemma is exacerbated for emerg-
ing securities markets frequently situated in countries with pressing human and
societal demands.
Yet, sufficient funding and resources are key to the success of a securities
oversight framework. For example, the most rigorous statutes have little impact
if the country lacks funds to hire, retain, and school the requisite number and
variety of personnel to competently administer the regulatory regimen. Hence,
without the necessary human and financial resources, even egregious violations
go undetected and the most elaborate regulatory framework proves futile.25
Therefore, a review of key characteristics in this context is warranted. Clearly,
the personnel employed by the subject SRO or governmental body must be compe-
tent and qualified. They must have the requisite education and training to adminis-
ter the pertinent framework. Sending employees abroad to acquire the necessary
acumen should be a matter of priority, as should inviting experts from abroad
to lend their insights. 26 Also, there should be a "critical mass" of employees in
both numbers and specialties. In addition to adequate support staff, attorneys,
accountants, financial analysts, and investigators should comprise the scene. Per-
sonnel alone is not sufficient. Given the ingenuity of those bent on fraud, the
requisite technology must be available to the enforcers. Of course, the degree
of the technology demanded will depend on the complexity of the particular
securities market.
With vigorous investigatory and enforcement powers, competent oversight
personnel in both number and specialty, and the use of appropriate technology,
much can be accomplished. Nonetheless, the task of attracting and retaining
personnel of high caliber remains. Some suggestions are offered. Certainly, em-
ployment with the applicable SRO or government regulator should be perceived
as a position having respect and status. Salaries (and other compensation benefits)
should be set as near as economically feasible to that earned by comparable
persons in the private sector. The same holds true for office accommodations.
They should be of similar quality as those used by respected professional firms
in the host country. To reward those who perform admirably, periodic salary
increases and promotion opportunities for more demanding positions should be
25. For example, although South Africa has a fairly detailed insider trading prohibition as well
as regulatory personnel to pursue alleged violators, thus far not one prosecution has been initiated.
See generally Franso H. van Zyl, South Africa: Insider Trading Regulation and Enforcement, 15
Co. LAW. No. 3, at 92 (1994).
26. See Burke, supra note 22, at 578 n. 111 (The Estonian Securities Market Act authorized the
creation of a Securities Board. The general director of the Board appointed Arno Puskar as the
assistant director. Puskar "is on a one year leave of absence from Bankers' Trust where he is a
securities analyst." Two other advisors appointed to the Board received training from the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on how to conduct inspections of securities firms.)
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made available. And last, the objective of achieving excellent performance should
be part of the culture and ethos of the applicable regulator as viewed from both
within and outside.27
The foregoing ideals can be actualized only with strong financial support. Put
simply, it will "take plenty of money. -28 With more pressing personal and societal
demands facing countries with emerging securities markets, how can these funds
feasibly be raised? A number of sources come to mind. First, a registration fee
may be collected when an issuer opts to have an offering of its securities. Second,
financial intermediaries, such as broker-dealers and investment advisers, may
be required to pay an annual or other periodic registration fee to the applicable
body as a condition of doing business. Third, companies and other types of
business enterprises may be subject to an annual franchise tax. Fourth, the relevant
stock exchange may collect a fee from companies listed on the exchange as a
privilege of having their securities traded on such exchange. Fifth, the relevant
stock exchange likewise may impose a user fee upon broker-dealers to reflect
their engaging in business through exchange facilities. Sixth, the SRO or the
government regulator may levy (or seek the levying through court order of)
money penalties against securities law violators.29
Collection of sufficient revenues without posing a disincentive for companies
and financial intermediaries to enter the applicable securities market is a delicate
task. If the charges levied are viewed as excessive, they will induce the relevant
players to divert at least a significant amount of their activity to other less intrusive
markets. This point becomes accentuated with respect to the imposition of money
penalties, which not only may be costly but also carry a stigma to one's reputation.
In light of the personal and societal needs of countries with emerging securities
markets, the distinct possibility also exists that the particular government will
make use of the fees generated to serve other more-pressing needs. Leaving
the applicable SRO or government regulator with meager funding disserves the
long-term economic interest of procuring the inflow of foreign capital. By provid-
ing an adequate level of funding for the SRO or government regulator to oversee
the applicable securities market, there will exist a greater likelihood of instilling
investor confidence.
On the other hand, allowing the applicable regulator to be entirely self-funding
from the fees and penalties collected creates the risk that a bloated bureaucracy
will emerge and that corruption will serve as the order of the day. Tying personnel
27. See Bruce A. Mann, What Constitutes a Successful Securities Regulatory Regime? 3 AUSTRA-
LIAN J. CORP. L. 178 (1993); Judith Miller, S.E.C.: Watchdog 1929 Lacked, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1979, at D I; JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET-A HISTORY OF THE SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1982).
28. GEORGE HARRISON, GOT MY MIND SET ON You (1987).
29. The SEC and the states tap a number of these sources. See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES
REGULATION (2d ed. 1993); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
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salaries and perquisites to the revenues generated is fraught with risk. For exam-
ple, if the levying of money fines against alleged violators directly redounds to
the financial benefit of the enforcers, nonmeritorious cases may be pursued and
excessive fines may be assessed. Such an occurrence would be catastrophic to
the success of any emerging securities market (except in those markets where
the market players, including investors, expect handsome returns).
III. Government Enforcement-Civil versus Criminal
When an alleged violation of the securities laws occurs, should civil and/
or criminal enforcement be pursued? To illustrate, the SEC may bring a civil
enforcement action seeking a wide range of relief, such as the entry of a cease
and desist order, ordering of an injunction, appointment of a receiver, levying
of money penalties, imposition of an officer and director bar, and ordering of
disgorgement of ill-gotten profits.3° Moreover, the SEC may institute criminal
contempt actions against those who have not obeyed injunctions previously is-
sued.31
In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice may criminally prosecute accused
violators of the federal securities laws. Hefty criminal sentences of up to ten
years' imprisonment as well as severe money fines may be imposed for many
violations (for example, for illegal insider trading, stock manipulation, and filing
materially false statements with the SEC).32 Added to the prosecutors' criminal
arsenal under U.S. law are statutes that may be invoked in addition to or in lieu
of the federal securities laws. These statutes include the federal mail and wire
fraud provisions as well as the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). 
3
The state securities laws (or "blue sky" laws) enacted by each of the fifty
states also provide for both civil and criminal government enforcement. Indeed,
some of the state securities laws are more onerous than the federal statutes. For
example, a number of states authorize criminal liability premised on principles
of strict liability.34
30. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 21;
George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67
MINN. L. REV. 865 (1983).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967).
32. See § 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a); Arthur F. Mathews,
Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes, 39 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 901 (1971).
33. See Carpenter v. United States, 485 U.S. 19 (1987) (federal mail and wire fraud statutes);
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (criminal RICO statute). Nonetheless, violations
often go undetected. See John R. Emshwiller, How Career Swindlers Run Rings Around SEC and
Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1995, at Al; Steve Stecklow, Owing $500 Million, New Era
Charity Seeks Refuge from Creditors, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1995, at Al.
34. See Buffo v. State, 415 So. 2d 1158 (Ala. 1982); JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW
§ 8.02[21[b] (1995); Mark A. Sargent, A Blue Sky State of Mind: The Meaning of 'Willfully' in
Blue Sky Criminal Cases, 20 Sac. REG. L.J. 96 (1992).
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The SROs in the United States also have significant civil enforcement powers.
For example, the stock exchanges may assess censures, bars, and money fines
upon broker-dealers and their associated persons who violate the federal securities
laws or the respective exchange's rules.35 An exchange also can delist a security.36
Moreover, the National Association of Securities Dealers has broad authority to
discipline those subject to its regulation.37
In contrast to the United States, many countries today, both in emerging and
more-developed securities markets, rely chiefly (if not solely) on criminal en-
forcement. It may be questioned whether this is the most effective approach.
Today, in a number of these countries such practices as insider trading are made
criminal where less than a decade ago they were viewed as standard fare or at
worst a slap against one's reputation. 38 From current experience, it appears at
this time that many judges and juries are reluctant to criminally convict supposedly
reputable businesspersons for practices that were part of the societal mainstream
a short while ago. Indeed, in a number of countries, there have been few if any
convictions for illegal insider trading (although the practice continues to occur
with some frequency)."
Although the climate in the United States points toward increased criminaliza-
tion of the securities laws, 40 this situation should be viewed from a historical
perspective. Insider trading serves as a useful example. Although the major U.S.
securities acts were enacted in the 1930s,41 it was not until the early 1960s that
the SEC instituted a key civil enforcement proceeding based on illegal insider
trading. 42 A significant appellate court decision based on an SEC civil action was
not handed down until the late 1960s.43 Some ten years later the U.S. Department
35. See Report: Broker-Dealer Supervision of Registered Representatives and Branch Office
Operations, 44 Bus. LAW. 1361 (1989).
36. See Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards Under
the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAW. 1461 (1992).
37. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 13.4(1520) (1995); Lee A. Pickard & Anthony W. Djinis, NASD Disciplinary Proceedings:
Practice and Procedure, 37 Bus. LAW. 1213 (1982).
38. See Andre Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Laws and Securities
Regulation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 757,762 (1982) (observing that in France tipping of inside information
is viewed as "a social duty ... expected of relatives and friends"); see also Escaping Through the
Net, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 7, 1992, at 95; Christof von Dryander, The German Securities Trading
Act: Insider Trading and Other Secondary Market Regulation, 9 INSIGHTS, Jan. 1995, at 26. Prior
to the insider trading legislation in Germany, insider trading was proscribed pursuant to self-regulatory
rules that became binding upon parties on a contractual basis. See Siegfried H. Elsing & Donna
Gasser, Stock Exchange Rules in Germany and the Treatment of Insider Trading, 14 INT'L Bus. L.
191 (1986).
39. See supra note 25 (South Africa). Australia's experience thus far has been similar. See Roman
Tomasic, Insider Trading Law Reform in Australia, 9 COMP. & SEC. L.J. 121 (1991).
40. See Ralph S. Janvey, Criminal Prosecution of Insider Trading, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 136 (1987).
41. The Securities Act of 1933 and The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are the major U.S.
securities acts.
42. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
43. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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of Justice brought the initial criminal prosecutions for insider trading violations.4
Hence, criminal prosecution was initiated only after successful civil enforcement
made clear that the practice at issue was illegitimate from a consensual point of
view. Although it seems doubtful that such an enforcement policy was part of
a grand strategic plan, the U.S. government's current success in the criminal
arena45 underscores the merits of this approach.
To buttress this proposition, the heavier burden of proof in a criminal as
compared to a civil proceeding perhaps has prompted judges and juries to refrain
from criminally convicting based on circumstantial evidence. 46 From a prosecu-
tor's viewpoint, financial frauds like insider trading or stock manipulation are
not necessarily subject to direct evidence; circumstantial evidence often remains
essential for a conviction. With some exceptions, prosecutors in the United States
have been more successful in this respect.47
Stated succinctly, it is not suggested that regulators in emerging capital markets
abandon criminal enforcement efforts. Rather, the point is that civil regulatory
remedies should be made available and should be invoked on a frequent basis.
Successful enforcement actions in civil suits will encourage compliance, stimulate
securities enforcement efforts in other contexts, and facilitate a consensual under-
standing of sanctionable behavior. Criminal enforcement under this scenario
would become the "heavy club" to be swung against those deemed sufficiently
blameworthy to deserve imprisonment.
IV. Private Attorney General-Public Benefit or Societal Waste?
Today, in the vast majority of countries having securities markets, complex
private securities litigation is a rarity. With prohibitions against attorney contin-
gency fees, the presence of a loser-pays structure, and significant barriers to
hurdle for initiating class action or derivative suits, this trend (absent modification)
will continue. a
On the other hand, the private attorney general approach has gained acceptance
in the United States. Over thirty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized
that private suits based on securities law violations were a "necessary supplement"
44. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, even
today, the government frequently fails to prevail. See, e.g., United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d
364 (2d Cir. 1991).
46. See T. E. Bostock, Australia's New Insider Trading Laws, 10 COMP. & SEC. L.J. 165 (1992).
47. See Testimony of Michael D. Mann, Director of SEC's Office of International Affairs,
Concerning the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act Before the U.S. Senate Subcom-
mittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights, Committee of the Judiciary (Aug. 4, 1994)
("As a general matter, the Commission's investigations involve extensive document review and are
often predicated on circumstantial evidence gleaned from the documents and from testimony. "). See
also SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
48. See Paul Redmond, The Reform of Directors'Duties, 15 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 86 (1991).
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to SEC enforcement action .49 With allowance for contingency fees, award ofgener-
ous attorneys' fees, recognition of the class action and derivative suit as useful
mechanisms to redress investor injury, and application of the general rule that each
party (win or lose) bears its own costs, private securities lawsuits seeking damages
(as well as other relief at times) proliferate the U.S. legal landscape.5
To opponents, many of these suits constitute vexatious litigation or, to use a
pejorative term, "strike suits." 5' The only clear winners, according to these
critics, are the attorneys. Annoyed by the time expenditures involved and ill
publicity, defendants opt to settle many of these actions. Shareholders receive
relatively modest financial recompense.52 In reaction to these consequences, the
United States in 1995 amended the federal securities acts to make such actions
more difficult to bring. 3
In light of the foregoing, should an emerging securities market authorize ag-
grieved investors to initiate private actions for damages against such persons as
directors, officers, broker-dealers, investment bankers, accountants, and attor-
neys for allegedly engaging in fraudulent practices? The costs of doing so appear
unacceptably high. Having such a system in place would present a strong incentive
for issuers and financial intermediaries to take their business to more hospitable
surroundings.54 Although investors supposedly would benefit, it is unlikely that
the existence of such a regimen would be influential in their decisions of where
to provide capital. After all, investors in emerging markets understand that risk
is an integral part of the process; generally, so long as the prospect for profit
is reasonable and minimally acceptable regulatory standards are effectively imple-
mented, the venture is given serious consideration. In short, investors in these
markets ordinarily do not anticipate bringing a lawsuit based on securities fraud
in the host country. Rather, if they seek to protect themselves in this context,
they do so through contractual warranties, use of arbitration clauses, or the con-
ducting of negotiations or other aspects of the transaction that cause U.S. subject-
matter jurisdiction to apply. 5
Moreover, most emerging capital markets are ill-suited for the type of complex
49. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
50. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Searching for Winners in a Loser Pays System, 78 A.B.A. J. 54
(1992).
51. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (referring to "the danger
of vexatious litigation").
52. See Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1991).
53. See Senate Overrides President's Veto; Securities Litigation Reform Bill Now Law, 28 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 3 (1996). See generally Contract with America (E. Gillespie & B. Schelhas,
eds., 1994).
54. Cf. Paul H. Baris, Israeli Securities Law, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 409 (1994) (describ-
ing current Israeli securities laws and the movement in favor of greater investor protection as the
Israeli economy develops).
55. See Richards v. Lloyd's of London, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,801 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
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litigation prevalent in the United States. The particular country's goals of effi-
ciency and satisfying more important needs render such a framework imprudent.
56
When judges and lawyers are not numerous, where their level of expertise on
such complex matters is not impressive, and where the citizenry and the govern-
ment must have expeditious access to the courts in order to resolve vital matters
relating to the human condition, the prospect of opening up the floodgates of
litigation to redress sophisticated investor woes sounds like utter nonsense.
Nonetheless, there are two key countervailing interests: investor compensation
and deterrence of fraudulent practices. Provided that the costs of providing mone-
tary relief to aggrieved investors are acceptable, these interests ought to be pur-
sued. The proper forum for doing so may be in the SRO or civil government
enforcement setting, or alternatively, by providing for a framework of arbitration.
In the government or SRO context, the applicable regulator should seek an
order of disgorgement of the alleged violator's ill-gotten gains. If so granted,
the amount disgorged should be held for the benefit of parties defrauded by the
violator's conduct. In this fashion, aggrieved investors will be afforded some
meaningful measure of relief without undue intrusion upon the judiciary.
To accomplish this objective in hopefully a more effective manner, consider-
ation should be given to establishing an administrative tribunal within the particu-
lar securities authority. Hearing examiners with expertise in securities law and
having no relationship with the securities authority would be appointed to decide
the cases brought. Depending on the norms of the particular country, appeal to
a court from an adverse determination by the hearing examiner may be available.
Such appeal may be provided as a matter of right or only if the sanctions levied
surpass certain levels of severity. Again, the degree of process accorded, of
course, is best left to the customs and norms of the applicable country.
Alternatively, a system calling for arbitration in the event of disputes implicat-
ing investor losses may be instituted. Conducted outside of the court system and
with the availability of qualified arbitrators, this alternative may provide adequate
redress without generating undue burdens on the judicial or administrative pro-
cess. Depending on the prevailing sophistication and resources available in the
applicable emerging market, either of the foregoing models may be adapted for
implementation.57
V. Regulation of Offerings-Disclosure versus Merit Regulation
In securities offerings conducted in their markets, should such emerging mar-
kets opt for a disclosure and/or merit-based approach? In a disclosure framework,
56. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
57. See generally MARILYN B. CANE & PATRICIA A. SHUB, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: LAW
AND PROCEDURE (1991); C. EDWARD FLETCHER, ARBITRATING SECURITIES DISPUTES (1990); Com-
mittee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of Task Force on the SEC Administrative Law
Judge Process, 47 Bus. LAW. 1731 (1992); D. Rhett Brandon & Glenn M. Reiter, Regulators Move
to Harmonize Capital Market Rules, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 53 (June 1996).
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all material information 8 normally should be disclosed in the form of written
offering materials. This information should include, for example, (1) material
historical information relating to such elements as assets, earnings, nature of
operations, and managerial self-dealing, (2) the purposes for which the proceeds
derived from the offering will be used, (3) reasonably accurate financial state-
ments prepared in compliance with recognized accounting practices and auditing
standards, and (4) forward-looking developments, events, and contingencies that
are reasonably likely to occur and to have a material financial effect on the
enterprise."
By contrast, merit regulation enables the securities authority, even if there is
accurate and full disclosure, to prevent the offering from being conducted if it
is determined that such offering is unfair, unjust, or inequitable. Such a determina-
tion may be reached, for example, if the insiders purchased their stock at extremely
low prices or seek to retain inequitable stock options or warrants, or where the
planned underwriter "spread" is deemed excessive. 6°
In the United States, the federal securities laws focus on disclosure. Merit
regulation is adhered to by a number of states, perhaps most notably California
and Texas. 6' By calling for disclosure, however, the SEC nonetheless impacts
upon substantive fairness. If self-dealing transactions must be disclosed, the insid-
ers are less likely to engage in such practices. Moreover, if such disclosure of
insider dealings reveals unacceptably abusive practices, the investment commu-
nity will be far less likely to support the contemplated offering.62
For emerging securities markets, it is suggested that a disclosure approach
should be adopted to the exclusion of a merit-based system.63 In a number of
such markets, the risk exists that adherence to merit regulation will serve as a
subterfuge for government assessments of character, integrity, and goodness-
a quasi-return, under the guise of capitalism, to the way business used to be
conducted in such countries. Such risk should not be undertaken since merit
58. Material information may be defined as (1) such information that a reasonable investor would
consider important in the making of a decision to buy or sell or (2) such information that is deemed
price sensitive. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Australian Corp. L. § 1002G,
discussed in Bostock, supra note 46, at 172.
59. See SEC FORMS OF REGISTRATIONS S-1, S-2, S-3; SEC FINANCIAL REPORTING RELEASE
No. 36 (1989); cf. GOWER REPORT (U.K.) on REvIEw OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (Part 1-1984,
Part 11-1985), with SEC, REPORT OF THE SEC's ADvIsoRY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLO-
SURE (1977).
60. See Richard B. Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 (1982).
61. See Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities Commit-
tee, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW. 785 (1986).
62. See Elliott J. Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Accountability, 34 Bus. LAW. 575 (1979).
63. See Burke, supra note 22, at 580 (Estonian Securities Board does not adhere to a merit-based
system and Securities Board "reviews the application to ensure the completeness of the information
provided"); Malaysia: Securities Commission Pledges to Adopt Full-Disclosure System, 9 INT'L SEC.
REG. REP. No. 14, at 9 (1996) (Malaysian Securities Commission plans "to shift its current merit-
based regulatory system to one based on a full-disclosure environment").
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regulation's costs exceed the speculative benefits that might otherwise be re-
ceived. Clearly, implementation of a market-efficient merit system calls for so-
phisticated and time-consuming judgments to be made. With efficient allocation
of sparse resources a necessity for emerging securities markets, such markets
should refrain from indulging in the luxury of a merit-based system.
Nonetheless, adoption of a disclosure approach alone leaves a gap that needs
to be filled. Although a disclosure-based system calls for revelation of material
insider dealings, such a system fails to address the propriety of even blatantly
unfair insider rip-offs. Nonetheless, if attractive profits are anticipated, many
astute investors will purchase the subject securities regardless of unfair insider
dealings .64
Irrespective of such investor nonchalance, a regulatory system should not stand
dormant. Moreover, the problem is exacerbated after the offering is completed,
especially when the insiders sell substantial amounts of stock in the offering while
retaining a sufficient percentage to retain control over the enterprise. In such a
scenario, these insiders would have even greater incentive to unduly benefit
themselves at the expense of the enterprise and unaffiliated security holders.
To rectify this abusive situation in a cost-effective fashion, consideration should
be given to directing the SRO or government securities regulator to promulgate
rules of fair practice to redress egregious misconduct. Such rules, for example,
could provide, after a proceeding before an arbitrator or a hearing officer as
described above, that the offending transactions be rescinded and that restitution
be made. Although such rules of fair practice should be cautiously adopted and
invoked, they may serve as a relatively efficient mechanism to discipline insider
abuse.65
VI. Facilitating Access to Capital Markets
Facilitating access to initial and secondary capital markets is key to the success
of emerging securities markets. Mechanisms should be implemented to allow
for the development of attractive markets where issuers, investors, and financial
intermediaries are accommodated in a manner that finds acceptance. The balance
struck depends on such factors as the type of investor participation (institutional
or individual), the applicable market's realistic attainment of some meaningful
degree of sophistication, and the deployment of sufficient resources (in terms of
funding, personnel, and technology).
With respect to initial capital markets, three types of offering scenarios are
addressed: (1) limited offerings made to a finite number of investors with some
investors having financial acumen; (2) offerings made in markets comprised
64. See generally Siegel, supra note 13, at 497.
65. Cf. Kenneth M. Raisler & Edward S. Geldermann, The CFTC's New Reparation Rules: In
Search of a Fair, Responsive, and Practical Forum for Resolving Commodity-Related Disputes, 40
Bus. LAW. 537 (1985).
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solely of institutional (and other presumably sophisticated) investors; and
(3) offerings directed at the general public, thereby encompassing the uninitiated.
Depending on the context, the affected market that develops may be either
private or public in character. For example, an initial offering made by an issuer
to twenty persons normally is private. However, if those persons thereupon sell
their interests to 500 different investors, a public market will emerge. Accord-
ingly, that an initial offering is made to few investors does not foreclose the
possibility that a public market will eventuate. This prospect affects issues relating
to disclosure, market abuse, resale of securities, and regulatory oversight.
66
A. "LIMITED" OFFERINGS
Where issuers seek to offer securities to a limited number of investors, questions
arise relating to the proper degree of government or SRO oversight. For example,
should there be mandated disclosure in this context? Should the issuer's offering
statement be subject to review by the regulatory authority? Should there be restric-
tions on purchasers reselling their securities to avoid the emergence of a public
market where a lack of adequate information exists concerning the subject issuer
and the securities?
Generally, in a limited offering, unlike one that is public, there is less govern-
ment or SRO regulation. No disclosure document may be required to be filed
with the regulatory authority and, if all purchasers are sophisticated, there may
be no mandated delivery of information. Prohibitions against fraud nonetheless
should apply in this context. 67 For oversight and fee-generating purposes, a form
notifying the regulatory authority of the offering may be demanded of issuers
and financial intermediaries.68
Generally, a limited offering may be viewed as having certain characteristics
depending on the construction given by the affected emerging securities market.
In this regard, such offerings are made to a finite number of investors. That
number may be ten, thirty-five, one hundred, or some other number that the
regulatory overseer concludes meets capital-raising needs without adversely im-
pacting on market integrity. Nonetheless, at some point, the offering of securities
on a widespread basis should signify that the offering is public (rather than
limited).
Whether a monetary ceiling should exist for an offering to qualify as "limited"
is another issue. For example, an offering is limited under U.S. law in certain
66. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC Securities Act Release No. 6389
(1982).
67. See Manning G. Warren, Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for
Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 355 (1984).
68. Cf. Form D that (although not fee generating) must be filed with the SEC when a Regulation
D limited offering is made. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 6825 (1989); Mark A. Sargent,
The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH.
U. L.Q. 225 (1990).
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contexts if the amount raised does not exceed $5 million during any twelve-month
period. 69 Otherwise, registration of the offering with the SEC is mandated. 70 For
emerging capital markets, it may be submitted that a distinction on a monetary
basis between limited and public offerings should not be implemented. Rather,
more relevant criteria focus on the manner of solicitation (for example, by adver-
tisements in newspapers versus by means of preexisting relationships), number
of offerees, and restrictions on resale. Also, irrespective of the monetary amount
sought to be raised in the offering, needed revenues can be raised by the regulatory
authority assessing fees upon the issuer and financial intermediaries for the privi-
lege of conducting the offering.
If the issuer and financial intermediaries engage in advertising or general solici-
tation, 7' there is good reason to require that an offering document adequately
describing the issuer, the terms of the offering, and the securities offered be
timely transmitted to all offerees. Otherwise, promoters will have free reign to
"hype" the offering, creating a "hot issue," and thereby condition members
of the public to purchase the securities without their being privy to sufficient
information. Because the prospect for fraud is greater in this setting, it may be
prudent to require that the offering statement be filed with and reviewed by the
securities regulator.72
No doubt, promoters also can "hype" an offering where investors are few in
number. Sophisticated investors, however, are more likely to distinguish "hype"
from "reality" and to demand the delivery of adequate disclosure. On the con-
trary, where investors are unsophisticated, such investors need to receive a basic
information package. Nonetheless, due to the monetary costs incurred by issuers
to generate a formal disclosure document, application of effectively implemented
provisions directed against fraudulent practices may be deemed sufficient where
the offering amount is relatively small.
An additional concern is that a supposed limited offering may be in reality a
public one where purchasers of large holdings "dump" their securities on the
market. If adequate information is not in the public domain, a distribution of
securities will occur in contravention of investor protection and market integrity
objectives. To ameliorate this situation, restrictions on resales may be considered,
such as those relating to holding periods (for example, security must be held for
a two-year period) and percentage of stock sold during a specified period (for
69. See SEC Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1995); Sargent, supra note 68; Warren, supra
note 67.
70. See MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 39-57 (2d ed. 1996); see supra
notes 65-67.
71. Certain SEC rules exempting limited or private offerings from registration prohibit advertising
or general solicitation. See SEC Rules 505, 506, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505, 230.506 (1995); sources
cited notes 65-68 supra.
72. See generally RALPH E. JANVEY, REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES MAR-
KETS 4.01-.02 (1992); Joseph I. Goldstein et al., An Investment Masquerade: A Descriptive
Overview of Penny Stock Fraud and the Federal Securities Laws, 47 Bus. LAW. 773 (1992).
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example, up to one percent of the issuer's outstanding stock during a three-month
period)."
A sound balance must be struck. Imposing overly stringent requirements on
issuers and financial intermediaries in the limited offering setting will dissuade
these participants from resorting to this capital-raising device. Nonetheless, there
is legitimate concern that many investors in these types of offerings in emerging
capital markets will be individual citizens who have relatively modest savings
and limited financial sophistication. Loss of individual investors' savings in specu-
lative investments will have repercussions throughout the affected economy and
therefore is a matter of serious concern.74
B. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR MARKETS
Generally, institutional investors are financially sophisticated. They have the
acumen, experience, personnel, and financial wherewithal to make astute invest-
ment decisions. They also have the leverage, particularly when acting in concert
with other like investors, to induce the issuer to disclose sufficient information.
Because there exists a level playing field in this context, there is good reason to
allow the various participants to fend for themselves. Hence, arguably only rules
relating to fraud need to be applied here.
Under this framework, an emerging securities market may seek to develop a
stock exchange where solely institutional (or other sophisticated) investors having
a specific net worth (such as U.S. $5 million) may participate. For each issuer
that seeks to list its securities on the exchange, negotiations would ensue among
the participants (the subject issuer, financial intermediaries, and prospective in-
vestors) concerning the degree of disclosure that the issuer would provide to the
market on a periodic basis, with the issuer being contractually bound to comply
with the negotiated terms. Alternatively, the exchange (or governmental regula-
tor) may promulgate minimum disclosure guidelines that all listed companies must
meet, while still enabling the parties to negotiate more rigorous requirements.
The prohibitions against fraud should apply in this setting. SRO or government
overseers, therefore, would monitor occurrences of fraudulent practices and,
depending on the framework adopted, help ensure compliance with applicable
disclosure mandates. Procurement of the necessary fees from market participants
to fund this mechanism should be attainable.
73. Cf. SEC Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1995) (sets forth certain criteria that a shareholder
must satisfy in order to come within the rule's protection). See Marc I. Steinberg & Joseph P.
Kempler, The Application and Effectiveness of SEC Rule 144, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 473 (1988).
74. See Richard W. Jennings, The Role of the State in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protec-
tion, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193 (1958); see also FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCE MODIGLIANI,
CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS (1992); Cheryl W. Gray et al., The Legal
Framework for Private Sector Development in a Transitional Economy: The Case of Poland, 22 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 283 (1992); Morgan & Kramer, Investment Fund Structures for Emerging
Markets, 28 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 157 (1995).
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This framework should be attractive to market participants. Costs of raising
capital for issuers are minimized. Qualified institutions can fend for themselves,
negotiating the requisite degree of disclosure in both the initial and secondary
markets as a condition for investing in the subject issuer. Mandated disclosure,
if any, imposed by regulators is not overly burdensome. Surveillance directed
against fraud remains within the purview of the SRO and government authorities.75
C. PUBLIC OFFERINGS
When issuers elect to tap unsophisticated investors for funds on a widespread
basis, the need for disclosure and surveillance should prevail. Investors in these
types of offerings normally are citizens of the country where the emerging securi-
ties market is situated. Being uninitiated investors, they more easily are induced
to part with their funds on the basis of false hopes and outright lies. Although
sound regulation cannot prevent the overly gullible from being manipulated, it
can minimize the degree of investor intoxication enveloping such offerings.76
Requiring sufficient disclosure and implementing adequate surveillance against
fraud should deter sharp practices. If a regulatory authority has been established,
the filing with such authority of the applicable disclosure documents transmitted
to investors should be mandated.77 Application of a cost-benefit analysis in this
context calls for these measures. Although capital raising may be impeded, this
downside is outweighed by the realistic prospect that, absent use of these mea-
sures, a significant number of the country's citizenry will suffer financial harm
(some of catastrophic magnitude). Such loss would redound to the applicable
country's economic detriment in terms of both consumer spending power and
savings. Indeed, for those individuals who were to incur severe financial loss,
basic needs such as food and housing no longer may be afforded. Hence, unlike
offerings made to sophisticated or foreign investors, a far greater likelihood of
adverse economic consequences impacting on domestic affairs persists in this
setting. Therefore, greater prudence should be demanded.75
D. SECONDARY MARKETS
In order for an emerging securities market to prove successful, a sound second-
ary trading market must develop. Without the presence of a liquid secondary
75. See Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Lansdale, Jr., Regulation S and Rule 144A: Creating a
Workable Fiction in an Expanding Global Securities Market, 29 INT'L LAW. 43 (1995).
76. See Jorge Gonzalez, Jr. & Christopher D. Olive, Foreign Issuer Disclosure and Accounting
Compliance in U.S. Public Offerings and Securities Listings, 1 NAFTA: LAW & Bus. REV. AMs.,
Summer 1995, at 39; Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983).
77. See Burke, supra note 22, at 579-84 (describing Estonia filing and solicitation requirements).
78. Hence, securities regulation is focused at problems "as old as the cupidity of sellers and
the gullibility of buyers." 1 Louis Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3 (2d ed. 1961).
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market that is efficient in pricing and maintaining basic standards of fair practice,
sophisticated investors will be reluctant to participate.
To develop a sound secondary trading market, certain conditions must be met.
First, there must be a sufficient number of buyers and sellers so that liquidity
of investment is enhanced. Second, adequacy of disclosure is key to enable market
participants to make informed investment decisions. Where the applicable market
consists of solely sophisticated investors (normally institutions) having an impres-
sive net worth, then the extent of disclosure called for may be subject to negotiation
as a matter of contract between the issuer, financial intermediaries, and affected
investors. The understanding reached should be enforceable as well by the subject
exchange, with delisting of the issuer an alternative sanction for noncompliance.79
Third, financial intermediaries, such as broker-dealers, market-makers, and spe-
cialists, should exist in sufficient numbers with each having adequate capital to
facilitate market liquidity. And, fourth, given the continual threat of abusive
activity (for example, stock manipulation, insider trading, and undisclosed exces-
sive brokerage commissions) as well as the lack of financial security (for example,
failure by broker-dealers to have sufficient net capital or provide for accurate
recording of trades), adequate surveillance and enforcement measures should be
implemented.8 °
Fulfillment of the foregoing conditions, of course, will not ensure the presence
of an attractive secondary trading market. To induce foreign investment, the
value of the securities purchased and the prospect for bountiful profit are key
and, depending on the applicable market, may override other considerations.
Moreover, cost considerations may prevent an emerging securities market from
expending the resources necessary for an optimal secondary trading market to
exist. Nonetheless, satisfaction of the above conditions normally should provide
great impetus for facilitating the development of an effective secondary trading
market.
VII. Overseeing Financial Intermediary Conduct-
Indeed a Delicate Task
Financial intermediaries are essential players in capital markets. They provide
needed liquidity, structuring of transactions, and, at times, capital to emerging
securities markets. Their roles may range from an investment banker orchestrating
a distribution of securities on behalf of an issuer to that of a broker acting as
agent for its clientele to that of a dealer engaging in transactions for its own
79. See James G. Christiansen, Russia: New Securities Law Brings Welcomed Improvements for
Disclosure, Supervisory Methods, 9 INT'L SEC. REG. REP. No. 14, at 3, 4 (1996) (describing Russia's
new securities laws, which mandate filing of quarterly reports akin to U.S. SEC Forms 10-K and
10-Q). See generally David P. Doherty et al., The Enforcement Role of the New York Stock Exchange,
85 Nw. U.L. REv. 637 (1991). See supra notes 68-72.
80. See supra notes 21, 37, 72, 79.
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account. Because of their function in the structuring and consummation of securi-
ties offerings, mergers, and acquisitions (euphemistically called deals), financial
intermediaries (particularly investment bankers) frequently hold the "passkey."
Phrased differently, financial intermediaries often control the red or green light
to the successful completion and marketing of securities deals. 8
With this power comes the risk of abuse. As alluded to previously,82 financial
intermediaries may engage in improper conduct such as stock manipulation,
insider trading, charging undisclosed excessive commissions, and a broad range
of other unfair practices in contravention of what is known as the "shingle"
theory.8 3 They also may run afoul of standards relating to financial integrity.
Failure to retain adequate capital, accurately record trades, and provide effective
settlement and clearing mechanisms will wreak havoc not only on the delinquent
financial intermediary, but, if severe, upon the affected capital markets.
84
Emerging securities markets therefore must oversee financial intermediary
practices from both fraud and financial integrity perspectives. Definitive rules
administered by the applicable regulator having sufficient enforcement powers
should be effectuated. In this context, three key concepts are registration, over-
sight, and enforcement.
Registration by such financial intermediaries as investment advisers, brokers,
and dealers with the applicable government regulator or SRO should be mandated.
Compulsory registration enables the regulator to qualify those meeting defined
standards, acts as a tracking procedure for identifying subject intermediaries
under its oversight authority, and serves as a fee-generating vehicle for costs
incurred. These fees (as well as a tax levied on brokerage commissions) also
may be used to establish a system of investor insurance to provide protection
against catastrophe should a broker-dealer become insolvent or abscond from
the jurisdiction with its customers' assets.85
To help ensure market integrity, oversight by the applicable regulator over
financial intermediaries is crucial. Such broker-dealer, investment adviser, or
other intermediary should be required to subscribe to enumerated rules of fair
practice and financial integrity, file reports with the regulator detailing its compli-
ance with capital adequacy standards, and be subject to inspections by SRO or
government personnel for ascertaining its adherence to specified financial and
81. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 380 (2d Cir. 1973);
MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 5.04[4] (1996).
82. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
83. The "shingle" theory posits that a broker-dealer, by hanging out its "shingle," impliedly
represents that its behavior and the conduct of its employees will be equitable and will comply with
professional norms. See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1969).
84. See JANVEY, supra note 72.
85. See generally Gregory S. Crespi, The Reach of the Federal Registration Requirements for
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisors, 17 SEC. REG. L.J. 339 (1990); David A. Lipton, A Primer
on Broker-Dealer Registration, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 899 (1987).
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operational directives.8 6 Because of the adverse fallout that all too realistically
may occur due to a broker-dealer's insolvency or grossly abusive practices, the
applicable regulator should assume an active oversight function in this setting.
87
To induce financial intermediaries to follow specified requirements and to
redress instances of misconduct, the applicable regulator must have sufficient
enforcement powers. The powers provided should cover the broad range of pro-
spective noncompliance. For technical violations causing relatively little harm,
entry of a cease and desist order should be appropriate for a first-time violator.
For repeat violators and for more serious offenders, such as where fraud is
perpetrated on certain clients or where a broker-dealer fails to carry sufficient
net capital, heftier penalties are warranted. Examples include levying a significant
monetary fine and suspending for a certain period of time the subject violator
from engaging in certain (or all) of its business activities. For egregious violators
or where there is a systematic breakdown throughout the organization, extreme
measures may be necessary. In such circumstances, the regulator may seek to
bar the violator from conducting business, have a receiver appointed to preserve
assets, and pursue criminal prosecution.88
Thus, the applicable regulator should have within its enforcement arsenal a
wide array of weaponry, deploying the appropriate mechanisms to disarm its
intended targets. Although granting such enforcement powers may lead to over-
zealousness on occasion, the dangers posed justify this risk. An efficiently run
regulatory structure, containing levels of internal review by relatively detached
personnel along with independent scrutiny by a judge or hearing examiner, should
discourage much of the overreaching that otherwise might ensue. Moreover, in
view of the tenuous situation that most emerging capital markets experience,
there is widespread recognition that enforcement powers should be finely tuned
and used only where clearly necessary. Otherwise, legitimate and well-heeled
financial intermediaries will take their activities elsewhere, leaving the affected
country without essential players in its capital market structure. 89
Irrespective of an emerging capital market's adoption of relatively comprehen-
sive procedures with respect to financial intermediaries situated within its borders,
vigilance also needs to be directed at rogue cross-border broker-dealer practices.
In today's awesomely paced technological world, there exists the continual threat
of fraud by financial intermediaries and other market participants from locations
86. See Burke, supra note 22, at 587-92 (describing Estonia's requirements for licensing and
regulating securities intermediaries).
87. See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 37, § 5.7; JANVEY, supra note 72, 4.01-.02;
STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 21, §§ 2:17, 13:01-:11.
88. See, e.g., SEC v. Prudential Secs., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,780 (D.D.C. 1992); SECv. Milken, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,200 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Rooney Pace, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,206 (SEC 1987).
89. See Scott & Wellons, supra note 1, at 1000-04; see also Butler et al., Draft Law of the
Russian Federation on Securities, 8 BUTTERWORTH'S J. INT'L BANK. & FIN. L. 133 (1993).
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abroad, having adverse ramifications in the affected emerging securities market.
To help guard against such cross-border abuses, understandings of cooperation
should be entered into with securities authorities from other nations. Pursuant
to such understandings, each regulator should agree to provide law enforcement
assistance and technological support to the other when a violation of its laws is
perpetrated from the other's jurisdiction. This mutuality of obligation approach,
based on the concept of reciprocity, should ameliorate to some extent cross-border
market abuses. 9°
VIII. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion illustrates the difficult challenge facing emerging
securities markets. To attract a continual flow of outside capital, such markets
ordinarily must offer the realistic lure of attractive profit, implement a sufficiently
credible regulatory framework to provide foreign institutional investors with
some degree of comfort, and induce the participation of sophisticated financial
intermediaries while engaging in delicate yet effective oversight. Certainly, this
task is difficult at best.
Even for those emerging markets that seek to attract principally domestic
sources of capital, tough issues must be addressed. While seeking to facilitate
the development of an active securities exchange, perceptions will exist that the
market should function without impediment and that regulation should play the
role of nominal bystander. In this context, however, proliferation of abusive
practices impacts directly on the affected country's citizenry. Severe losses suf-
fered by its investor-citizens may spell economic disaster in terms of diminished
consumer spending power and even inability to purchase essential goods on the
same level as before the debacle. Hence, sensitive benefit/loss assessments must
be made. The balance struck should involve considerations that focus on promot-
ing capital formation, facilitating the presence of a viable securities market, and
providing some meaningful protection for its citizen-investors against the specter
of rampant securities market fraud.
Determinations also should be made by emerging capital markets with respect
to specific market abuses and corporate control transactions. For example, statutes
and rules may be prescribed relating to insider trading practices91 as well as
mergers and acquisitions. 92 The specificity and detail of the approach adopted
90. See Michael D. Mann et al., Developments in International Securities Law Enforcement and
Regulation, 29 INT'L LAW. 729 (1995); Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Without
Frontiers: Trends in the International Response to Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1992, at 192.
91. See generally WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1996).
92. See generally H. LEIGH FFRENCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS
(1987); NORMAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LONDONS' BIG BANG AND
THE EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS (1991); TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARIES
(Marc I. Steinberg ed., 1985).
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with respect to such practices and events will reflect policy considerations as
well as perceptions of acceptable business conduct.
To help ensure periodic review of the framework then in place, institution of
"sunset" provisions may be incorporated in statutes and regulations. 93 Such an
approach may be useful for emerging capital markets that foresee incremental
change. While not foreclosing in any way revision of applicable statutes and
regulations at an earlier point, "sunset" provisions seek to compel reconsidera-
tion of the existing framework by a specified date in the future. However, the
huge drawback attendant to such a timed review is the risk that the governing
authorities will be concerned with more pressing priorities, or a different climate
will prevail in the legislature, thereby causing insufficient attention to be focused
on the issue. Indeed, if preoccupied with more urgent matters, the legislature
may allow the applicable statutes to lapse, leaving no governing law in existence.
This prospect should give one pause before endorsing the use of sunset provisions.
Irrespective of the contours of the system in place for an emerging securities
market, a frequently important criterion impacting on ultimate success or failure
is whether the various participants lend their support. Without receiving such
approbation from affected constituencies, the road to success may be far too
arduous. Enabling key players to provide input, engage in dialogue, and reach
consensus will facilitate their acceptance of the system. By having a perceived
stake in this framework, hopefully they will be more receptive to work toward
its success. Thus, emerging securities markets embark on a difficult journey.
Persuading affected constituencies to embrace the framework adopted represents
for many emerging securities markets a critical determinant.
93. See 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 853 (1995) (concept of U.S. federal agency funded
through user fee).
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